The relativism is sometimes considered attractive because it is confused with the anti-dogmatism , ie with the attitude of those who do not erect their own beliefs critically unassailable dogmas and is ready to review them in light of the beliefs of others, thus proving willing to talk and attentive to the arguments of others. In this connection it may be noted first that seems inappropriate to call the anti-dogmatism and relativism on the other side the anti-dogmatism, as well as the dogmatism, is not implied by any of the positions of ethical relativism and none of the positions that are opposed to these. Those who adopt the normative ethical relativism, that is, those who adopt a doctrine of moral relativism, can be either dogmatic or anti-dogmatic, that is ready to change its moral teaching, not unlike those who adopt a doctrine of moral universalism. For
relativism, the question of whether some moral judgments are true or false is in a sense a private matter for him who utters the assessment, because this will probably be true for the speaker, that is, on the basis of fundamental moral beliefs that he adopted (and allegedly false based on other fundamental moral beliefs that others could adopt or take). Those who adopt the relativist position, therefore, has no particular reasons to consider moral judgments and the reasons advanced by others with which they are justified: the question of whether these judgments, given the reasons that underpin them, are the best candidates for the truth own judgments hardly arises where it is believed that each individual has their own truth. Even less inclined to assess their own moral judgments compared with those of others who will then adopt the position of metaethical skepticism: for those who believe that moral judgments express feelings and emotions only, or tastes personally, it does not seem reasonable to start a discussion with a view to identifying the best moral judgments, that is more firmly supported by reasons (as is known, it is useless to argue about taste).
Another attraction of relativism is sometimes found in tolerance, since it seems to some that relativism, in any of its forms, implies tolerance . Normative ethical relativism, in his version, actually requires a certain form of tolerance, since it requires every culture not to interfere in the affairs of other cultures. Certainly, however, does not require legal relativism, in any of its forms, tolerance which we use to assign value, that is, non-interference of power in certain areas of human action, such as the expression of thought or of religion because it gives validity to the rules of every culture, regardless of whether or not such guarantee guaranteeing freedom of expression, religious freedom or any other freedom.
fairly common idea is that the value of tolerance presupposes skepticism or relativism metaethical metaethics, for only by the conviction that in ethics there are many truths or no truth can follow the idea that there is no reason to impose on others our moral beliefs or certain behaviors that appear righteous. Even this way of thinking, however, is clearly wrong: skepticism and relativism metaethical metaethics does not imply any particular value, and even then the value of tolerance. Some seem to believe that finally
relativism follow pacifism and its opposite the legitimacy of the war, at least in some circumstances. In particular responsibilities are set against the doctrines of war that do exactly the universal moral value of democracy or the idea of \u200b\u200bhuman rights. This position, however, is clearly wrong. On the one hand it is true that the normative ethical relativism ensures peace among different cultures (And this is clearly not insured or guaranteed by descriptive ethical relativism or relativism metaethical). On the other hand, however, is not true that the normative ethical universalism necessarily legitimate the war in some circumstances. The universal moral doctrines may in fact be as varied as the content, and therefore can be very different even from the positions that they descend on the legality of war in either circumstance.
Nor can it be argued that the war is necessarily entitled to make its universal doctrine that the value of democracy or the idea of \u200b\u200bhuman rights. Whether and under what circumstances the war is legitimate depends, again, the overall content of these doctrines. It is certainly likely that the doctrines of this kind allow actions and measures to encourage the establishment of democratic regimes or to ensure the protection of human rights. But these interventions are not necessarily war: they are certainly possible universal doctrine that in all circumstances (or in almost all circumstances) allow only forms of assistance that would be considered favorably by most pacifists. (eighteen)
relativism, the question of whether some moral judgments are true or false is in a sense a private matter for him who utters the assessment, because this will probably be true for the speaker, that is, on the basis of fundamental moral beliefs that he adopted (and allegedly false based on other fundamental moral beliefs that others could adopt or take). Those who adopt the relativist position, therefore, has no particular reasons to consider moral judgments and the reasons advanced by others with which they are justified: the question of whether these judgments, given the reasons that underpin them, are the best candidates for the truth own judgments hardly arises where it is believed that each individual has their own truth. Even less inclined to assess their own moral judgments compared with those of others who will then adopt the position of metaethical skepticism: for those who believe that moral judgments express feelings and emotions only, or tastes personally, it does not seem reasonable to start a discussion with a view to identifying the best moral judgments, that is more firmly supported by reasons (as is known, it is useless to argue about taste).
Another attraction of relativism is sometimes found in tolerance, since it seems to some that relativism, in any of its forms, implies tolerance . Normative ethical relativism, in his version, actually requires a certain form of tolerance, since it requires every culture not to interfere in the affairs of other cultures. Certainly, however, does not require legal relativism, in any of its forms, tolerance which we use to assign value, that is, non-interference of power in certain areas of human action, such as the expression of thought or of religion because it gives validity to the rules of every culture, regardless of whether or not such guarantee guaranteeing freedom of expression, religious freedom or any other freedom.
fairly common idea is that the value of tolerance presupposes skepticism or relativism metaethical metaethics, for only by the conviction that in ethics there are many truths or no truth can follow the idea that there is no reason to impose on others our moral beliefs or certain behaviors that appear righteous. Even this way of thinking, however, is clearly wrong: skepticism and relativism metaethical metaethics does not imply any particular value, and even then the value of tolerance. Some seem to believe that finally
relativism follow pacifism and its opposite the legitimacy of the war, at least in some circumstances. In particular responsibilities are set against the doctrines of war that do exactly the universal moral value of democracy or the idea of \u200b\u200bhuman rights. This position, however, is clearly wrong. On the one hand it is true that the normative ethical relativism ensures peace among different cultures (And this is clearly not insured or guaranteed by descriptive ethical relativism or relativism metaethical). On the other hand, however, is not true that the normative ethical universalism necessarily legitimate the war in some circumstances. The universal moral doctrines may in fact be as varied as the content, and therefore can be very different even from the positions that they descend on the legality of war in either circumstance.
Nor can it be argued that the war is necessarily entitled to make its universal doctrine that the value of democracy or the idea of \u200b\u200bhuman rights. Whether and under what circumstances the war is legitimate depends, again, the overall content of these doctrines. It is certainly likely that the doctrines of this kind allow actions and measures to encourage the establishment of democratic regimes or to ensure the protection of human rights. But these interventions are not necessarily war: they are certainly possible universal doctrine that in all circumstances (or in almost all circumstances) allow only forms of assistance that would be considered favorably by most pacifists. (eighteen)